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1 INTRODUCTION
The second unbundling, or the fragmentation of production chains across borders, is one of
the most distinctive feature of the last 30 years of globalization (Baldwin, 2011). Nonetheless,
our understanding of its implications for trade theory and policy is only in its infancy. One
explanation for this delay is the only-recent release of input-output matrices that cover the
whole world and allow for a better understanding of the location of production across global
value chains.
One implication of global value chains is that ‘Made in China’ no longer means ‘Made
in China’. Koopman et al. (2008) estimate that the share of domestic content in China
exports is about 50%. One recurring example is that of Apple’s iPad, ‘Made in China’ but
with Chinese labor accounting for only about 3% of its value added. Gross trade figures,
e.g. Chinese exports of iPads, are hence no perfect guide to understand where value addition
occurs. They also imply a ‘double-counting’ of value added, as the value added embedded
in parts and components is counted when both intermediates and final goods cross borders.
The ‘double-counting’ means that trade data overstates the domestic value-added content of
exports (see Figure 1).
Economists have thus recently focused on capturing the value-added content of trade
(Johnson and Noguera, 2012). Extracting the value-added embedded in exports allows us
to trace where factors of production are used. For example, it allows us to identify that
China’s electronics exports embed wages paid to Chinese labor and profits pocketed by
US wholesalers. It elucidates the paradox that labor-abundant China apparently exports
capital-intensive and sophisticated products (Krugman, 2008). When looking at trade in
value added, we find that China actually exports only unskilled labor embedded in iPads.
Another example is that of Boeing’s Dreamliner. While it is ‘Made in the USA’, it embeds
value from a long list of countries.
We suggest that trade in value added should follow theories of comparative advantage
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more closely than gross trade. The reason is that it tells you where factors of production,
e.g. skilled and unskilled labor, are used. As Daudin et al. (2011) notes, only a value-added
trade measure can answer the question ‘who produces for whom in the world economy?’.
Value-added trade thus offers a new lens to test for theories of comparative advantage.
Do skill-abundant countries export skill-intensive products? Or rather, do skill-abundant
countries export skill-intensive value-added? Previous tests of comparative advantage theories
based on factor endowments include Romalis (2004) (and extensions in Morrow, 2010; Regolo,
2013), who shows that the US imports more skill-intensive products from skill-abundant
countries, Chor (2010) who explains industry trade flows using Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) and
other sources of comparative advantage, and Trefler and Zhu (2010), who tests for factor
content predictions (the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) test) in the presence of
traded intermediates.
In this paper we combine Chor (2010) and Johnson and Noguera (2012) to provide
novel evidence for Heckscher-Ohlin theory. The Heckscher-Ohlin prediction is that countries
will export goods whose production uses its abundant factor intensively. But, as Leamer
(1987, p.985) points out, the theoretical prediction is properly interpreted to refer to value
added, not gross output. We thus expect that the value-added trade patterns fit the
Heckscher-Ohlin prediction better than gross trade patterns as they capture precisely the
location of production factors. We mimic the gravity regression setting of Chor (2010), who
tested for different sources of comparative advantage, but including value-added trade rather
than gross trade data on the left-hand side. In doing so we generalize the approach of Davis
and Weinstein (2001), Trefler and Zhu (2010) and others to test for Heckscher-Ohlin-type
predictions to a framework with bilateral trade costs.1 In robustness checks we also do HOV
tests a` la Trefler and Zhu (2010), as well as graphical analysis a` la Romalis (2004), both of
which strengthen our argument.
We thus add to a resurgence of papers that decompose the factor content of trade to
1Davis and Weinstein (2001) modify the standard HOV test and use a gravity framework to account for
trade costs and estimate the factor content of demand for tradables.
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test for factor proportions theory, e.g. Egger et al. (2011) and Fisher (2011) who show that
it is important to take into account international differences in technology, which depends
largely on variation in labor requirements across countries (Nishioka, 2012). Our paper is
also in line with Fisher and Marshall (2013) who insist that the factor content of trade in
labor is not an exchange of person-years, but trade in value added attributed to a worker.
We find empirical evidence that HO theory does predict manufacturing trade in value-added,
and it does so better than for gross shipment flows. The paper proceeds as follows. In the
next section we describe the data and present our empirical strategy. A third section presents
the results and a fourth concludes.
2 DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We use data from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). It provides international
input-output tables for 40 countries, 34 sectors, from 1995 to 2009 (Timmer, 2012). This
data allows us to compute the value added embedded in final imports as the sale value of a
product equals to the cost of intermediate inputs plus value added. Here value added refers
to payments to primary inputs such as different types of labor. For example we can identify
where the workers involved into Chinese electronics were employed, by sector and by nation.
It would most likely involve skilled labor in the US who designed and market the product, as
well as workers in Taiwan that produced the parts and components, as well as other inputs
from the chemical and metal industries in other countries. By tracking down the whole
process until the sales value equals the sum of value added components, we can trace the
value added by industry and country. Computing value-added exports is straightforward
using matrix algebra (see Johnson and Noguera, 2012):
V A = F (I −B)−1X
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where V A is a (NJ, 1) vector (N countries and J sectors) that collects the value-added
generated in country o and sector j, and embodied final demand; F is a (NJ,NJ) diagonal
matrix with the ratio of direct value-added to gross output for each country and sector
on the diagonal, (I − B)−1 is the (NJ,NJ) Leontief inverse - it estimates the amount of
intermediates per US$ of final output after all rounds of intermediate shipments across sectors
and countries. X is the (NJ, 1) vector of gross shipments for final demand - where N here
denotes the set of destination countries.
Trade in value added may be direct (embodied in bilateral gross trade shipments) or
indirect (traveling through intermediate shipments that cross multiple borders) - see Figure
2 for an illustrative example. We label the total value added trade as ‘Virtual VA trade’.
Figure 3 shows the difference between trade in value added and in gross terms for China.
One clear observation is that the contribution of China in global value-added trade is smaller
than in gross terms. Overall, China gross trade with other Asian countries and with the EU
and the US include more foreign than Chinese value added. The difference in the two flows
is even bigger in China’s exports to Asia, as many of those are parts that will be re-exported
to the US or the EU and thus embedded in China’s value-added exports to the US and EU.
Figure 4 shows that China’s top export sectors in value-added terms are different from those
in gross terms. While electric equipment remains on top, plastics, transport equipment
(cars), and leather fall out of the top 10. One explanation is that most of the leather
exported from China embeds value added in, say, Ethiopia, and plastic exports embed oil
from Indonesia. Mining and agriculture enter the top 10 in value-added terms. The case of
mining is of particular importance as it provides some prima facie evidence of how trade
in value-added can better capture factor abundance forces. Whilst China is abundant in
primary inputs that are specific to the the mining sector (e.g. rare earths), gross trade
figures suggest Chinese mining products are not a major export sector - not least, because
of protectionist trade and industrial policies. In value-added terms, where we are able to
include the input-ouput linkages between the mining and other manufacturing sectors, we
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observe that indeed China exports a lot of value-added generated in the mining industry,
as factor abundance theories would suggest. To provide a concrete example, while China
doesn’t export rare earths, it embeds them in electronic exports. Mining thus accounts for
a large share of value-added exported through this type of supply chain linkages.
Figures 5 and 6 similarly display the case of Japan exports. Japan’s value-added exports
to the US and EU are larger, not smaller, than its gross exports. This may reflect the
more upstream position of Japan in global value chains than China. Japanese value-added
is embedded in China’s and other Southeast Asian countries exports of electronics to the US
and the EU, and hence does not show up in the gross trade of Japan with those destination
markets. When we look at the sectoral breakdown (Figure 6), services such as finance,
inland transport, and wholesale do not appear as top-10 gross exports but do make the
list for value-added exports as they are embedded in Japan’s sophisticated exports. This
pattern is again indicative of HO forces being at work more in value-added than in gross
trade statistics, insofar as services such as finance use skilled labor intensively (and Japan
being relatively skill-abundant).
WIOD also provides data on factor use and payments - three types of labor (high-skilled,
medium-skilled and low-skilled) and capital. We follow Timmer et al. (2014) and merge the
low and medium categories in an ‘unskilled’ aggregate. The factors are Unskilled labor (LUS)
and High-skilled labor (LHS). We do not focus on physical capital as it is constructed as a
residual and is thus not as precisely-measured as human capital endowments. Moreover we
follow Wood (1994) and think of it more as a traded good rather than an endowment - see
also Caselli and Feyrer (2007) for corroborative evidence.
We regress virtual VA exports and gross exports on relative endowments interacted with
relative intensities. Formally, we estimate the following model:
ln(V A)odit = αdit + σot + β1 ln(
lhs
lus
)oit + β2 ln(
lhs
lus
)oit × ln(Lhs
Lus
)ot + εodit
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where αdit and σot are importer-industry-year and exporter-year dummies. L stands
for labor, hs for skilled and us for unskilled types. Lower-case letters are for intensities,
upper-case endowments. In the cross-section specification, the time subscript drops out.
We mimic the specification of Chor (2010), but focus on relative skill abundance and
(possibly country-varying) skill intensity as the only comparative advantage source of trade
specialization in value added and gross terms.2
The coefficient of interest, β2, is identified within destination country and industry from
variation in relative skill endowments and intensity across country of origin (for gross trade)
and country where value-added is created (for value-added trade). The country of origin
dummies further control for all determinants of trade that shift exports from country o. The
HO logic suggests that, for a given market d and industry i, trade should be higher from
skill-abundant countries, if they use skill intensively in industry i. Our prediction is that β2
is positive and significant, even more so for value-added exports than for gross exports.
3 RESULTS
When we focus on manufacturing sectors our prediction is confirmed. Countries export
more skilled-intensive value-added if they are relatively skill abundant. The coefficient on
the interaction of relative skill intensity ( lhs
lus
) and relative skill endowment (Lhs
Lus
) is positive
and significant in all 3 specifications. This is true both in the cross section, i.e. the 1995-2009
average (Table 1) and the panel (Table 2). In the second specification (column 2), we add
terms that capture the relative capital abundance and intensities, on top of the skill terms.
While we find no effect for capital intensity, this additional term does not alter the coefficients
on the skill terms. As we mentioned earlier, physical capital is constructed as a residual and
2We estimated also extended specifications of our baseline regression in (1) adding other potential sources
of comparative advantage (e.g. the quality of institutions and contract intensity), similarly to Chor (2010).
The estimates of the HO interaction coefficient are similar, while other comparative advantage forces have
no robust effect across specifications.
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is thus not as precisely-measured as human capital endowments. Adding gravity controls
(column 3) as in Chor (2010) does not alter the results either.
These results are all the more interesting when compared to those with gross exports on
the left-hand side (Columns 4-6). Indeed, we find no indication of Heckscher-Ohlin forces
significantly affecting gross manufacturing trade patterns. These contrasting results are
illustrated in Figure 7. The latter plots the elasticities estimated in columns 1 and 4 of
Table 1. For a country with relatively high skill abundance, such as South Korea, a 10%
increase in skill intensity corresponds to an increase in VA exports of about 4%. For a country
with relative skill scarcity, such as India, a 10% increase in skill intensity corresponds to a
decrease in VA exports of about 5%. This is exactly in line with countries exporting along
their comparative advantage. When looking at gross exports, we do not find such clearly
differing elasticities at the opposite end of the skill abundance distribution.
When looking at services and total trade (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6) we find no significant
difference between gross and virtual VA flows. This is illustrated in Figure 8. While
the results still lean more in favor of Heckscher-Ohlin forces when looking at services in
value-added terms, we find no significant difference between the 2 types of flows. This
difference between services and manufacturing may be explained by the fact that is it mostly
in manufacturing that global value chains have emerged.
In what follows we do HO tests a` la Trefler and Zhu (2010), as well as figures a` la
Romalis (2004), to strengthen our argument. Figure 9 is inspired by Figure 1 in Romalis
(2004), which gave the example of Germany’s and Bangladesh’s exports to the US. It
showed that US imports from Germany, where the average adult has more than ten years of
education, accounted for larger shares of US imports in skill-intensive commodities. Imports
from Bangladesh, on the other hand, were concentrated in commodities that require little
skilled labor. This illustrated the quasi-Heckscher-Ohlin prediction that, once controlling
for transport costs and allowing for monopolistic competition, countries abundant in skilled
labor capture larger shares of US imports in skill-intensive products. Figure 9 provides a
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similar picture for US imports, both in gross and VA terms, from China, Germany, Japan
and Mexico. The horizontal axis measures the US skill-intensity of each sector, the vertical
axis the share of US imports. The figure highlights the contrasts between China and Japan
as well as between Germany and Mexico. For Japan and Germany, countries with skill
endowments similar to the US, the estimated share of US imports does not vary much
across skill intensities. For China and Mexico, skill-scarce countries relative to the US,
there is a clear downward trend suggesting that their exports account for smaller shares in
skill-intensive sectors. But what is most interesting is that the differences in import shares
across sectors are even bigger when trade is measured in VA terms. In other words, VA trade
is more sensitive to skill intensity. This confirms our previous results, namely that the HO
prediction is stronger when trade is measured in value added.
Trefler and Zhu (2010) offer a test for factor content predictions (HOV) in the presence of
traded intermediates. They compute the labor content of net exports across 40 countries, F ,
accounting for trade in intermediate inputs, and show that the latter is positively correlated
with relative labor endowments, defined as V − sVw, where V is the country’s endowment,
s is the country’s share of world’s consumption, and Vw the world’s endowment. Trefler and
Zhu (2010)’s Figure 1 focuses on the Vanek prediction for labor. In Figure 10 we look more
precisely at the unskilled-labor content of net exports, and compare the cases of unskilled
labor embedded in gross trade and via intermediates that can travel through many industries
and countries (‘F gross trade’ vs. ‘F VA trade’). More precisely, each observation of ‘F
gross trade’ equals: fct =
∑
i acitXcit−
∑
o 6=c
∑
i aoitXocit, where acitXcit equals the unskilled
labour content of total country c’s gross exports X (a being the unskilled input requirement)
and aoitXocit is the unskilled labour embedded in gross imports of country c coming from
country o - the unskilled labour requirements are hence specific to the origin country o. Each
observation of ‘F VA trade’ equals instead net trade in unskilled labor taking into account
all the possible input-output linkages - using the Leontief inverse (I −B)−1 (see also Trefler
and Zhu, 2010, p. 197). As in Trefler and Zhu (2010) we normalize F and V − sVw by s 12σ
where σ2 is the cross-country variance of the residuals: (F − V + sWw).
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We find a positive and significant relationship between net exports of unskilled labor
and relative unskilled-labor endowments, as well as a high R-squared around 0.9, wether
we account for global value chains or not. Yet the slope coefficient is much larger under a
VA-trade scenario, at 0.1176 vs. 0.0015, suggesting that HO effects are stronger when we
account for global value chains. The difference is even starker when we look at the variance
ratio V ar(F )
V ar(V−sVw) (or, as Trefler, 1995 coined it, the ‘missing trade’ statistics) as a more specific
measure of fit. While it is very low in the ‘F VA trade’ specification (0.01), it is still much
larger than under the gross-trade scenario, where it is practically zero. The consistently
higher trade in unskilled labor that we obtain when we consider global value chains has a
clear intuition. The unbundling of production across borders expands the possibilities to
trade and hence for factors of production to ‘travel’ through traded intermediates. What’s
more, this higher trade in factors is positively correlated with factor abundance, as the higher
slope coefficient in the ‘F VA trade’ suggests.
When we remove the China and India outliers, as in the bottom panel of Figure 10, we
find a similar difference in coefficients and a large difference in R-squared, at 0.92 when we
take global value chains into account, and at 0.67 when we don’t. This confirms our previous
result that HO forces are all the more relevant when we take global value chains into account,
i.e. when we look at virtual VA trade, rather than gross trade, and here specifically when
we compare virtual flows of unskilled labor to the flows of unskilled labor embedded in gross
trade. As before, trade in unskilled labor through global supply chains is much larger than
trade in unskilled labour through gross trade.
4 CONCLUSION
Tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory have come a long way since Leontief’s paradox, i.e.
the observation in 1953 that the US, a capital abundant country, was importing mostly
capital-intensive goods, and since Bowen et al. (1987) claimed that net factor exports are
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no better predicted by measured factor abundance than by a coin flip. While many studies
have followed and claimed that the theory performed (more or less) badly empirically, we
find empirical evidence that it does predict manufacturing trade in value-added, and it does
so better than for gross shipment flows. Countries exports ‘value’ that they produce using
their abundant factor intensively. As Nishioka (2012) noted, the bulk of world factor content
of trade does not arise from specialization across goods, but rather via specialization in
abundance-inspired techniques. One note of caution is that when we look at total trade,
we do not find any statistical difference between VA and gross flows. This may be because
global value chains are still mostly national. The spread of global value chains should make
HO theory more, rather than less, relevant.
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Table 1: Manufacturing trade - Cross-section
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Virtual VA Gross exports
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
× ln
(
Lhs
Lus
)
0.309*** 0.339*** 0.339*** 0.167 0.159 0.159
(0.0800) (0.0918) (0.0945) (0.112) (0.129) (0.132)
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
0.642*** 0.560*** 0.560** 0.222 0.109 0.109
(0.209) (0.215) (0.221) (0.266) (0.283) (0.290)
ln
(
k
lus
)
× ln
(
K
Lus
)
-0.00931 -0.00931 0.0155 0.0155
(0.0297) (0.0302) (0.0335) (0.0344)
ln
(
k
lus
)
0.272** 0.272** 0.137 0.137
(0.125) (0.127) (0.138) (0.142)
Log(distance) -0.717*** -0.981***
(0.0508) (0.0678)
Same cty 2.029*** 2.186***
(0.195) (0.238)
Share border 0.490*** 0.655***
(0.0918) (0.113)
Common lang 0.0300 0.0501
(0.0918) (0.110)
Colony 0.158* 0.302***
(0.0891) (0.110)
Legal 0.187*** 0.256***
(0.0432) (0.0510)
FTA 0.393*** 0.506***
(0.0919) (0.123)
Obs 25,520 25,520 25,520 25,520 25,520 25,520
R2 0.671 0.674 0.854 0.575 0.577 0.807
All regressions include importer-industry and exporter dummies. Two-way clustered standard errors by
exporter-industry and country-pair are in parenthesis. Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
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Table 2: Manufacturing trade - Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Virtual VA Gross exports
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
× ln
(
Lhs
Lus
)
0.285*** 0.307*** 0.307*** 0.170* 0.164 0.164
(0.0674) (0.0752) (0.0776) (0.0950) (0.107) (0.110)
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
0.577*** 0.507*** 0.507*** 0.236 0.145 0.145
(0.174) (0.177) (0.182) (0.220) (0.232) (0.238)
ln
(
k
lus
)
× ln
(
K
Lus
)
-0.00686 -0.00686 0.0132 0.0132
(0.0263) (0.0268) (0.0294) (0.0302)
ln
(
k
lus
)
0.235** 0.235** 0.123 0.123
(0.110) (0.112) (0.121) (0.124)
Log(distance) -0.816*** -1.095***
(0.0427) (0.0566)
Same cty 1.945*** 2.080***
(0.202) (0.246)
Share border 0.439*** 0.595***
(0.0867) (0.107)
Common lang 0.0374 0.0593
(0.0948) (0.112)
Colony 0.112 0.252**
(0.0898) (0.110)
Legal 0.172*** 0.238***
(0.0440) (0.0516)
FTA 0.0966 0.180**
(0.0604) (0.0758)
Obs 382,440 382,440 382,440 382,440 382,440 382,440
R2 0.669 0.672 0.843 0.566 0.567 0.783
All regressions include importer-industry-year and exporter-year dummies. Two-way clustered standard
errors by exporter-industry and country-pair are in parenthesis. Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
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Table 3: Services trade - Cross-section
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Virtual VA Gross exports
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
× ln
(
Lhs
Lus
)
0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.0693* 0.0964** 0.0964**
(0.0342) (0.0349) (0.0375) (0.0388) (0.0411) (0.0443)
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
0.181** 0.201** 0.201** 0.0724 0.144 0.144
(0.0778) (0.0816) (0.0883) (0.0940) (0.101) (0.109)
ln
(
k
lus
)
× ln
(
K
Lus
)
0.00662 0.00662 -0.0198 -0.0198
(0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0134) (0.0144)
ln
(
k
lus
)
-0.0709 -0.0709 0.0110 0.0110
(0.0549) (0.0584) (0.0602) (0.0653)
Log(distance) -0.564*** -0.280***
(0.0461) (0.0739)
Same cty 4.340*** 6.728***
(0.163) (0.249)
Share border 0.347*** 0.572***
(0.0857) (0.112)
Common lang 0.0571 0.108
(0.0836) (0.123)
Colony 0.210** 0.351***
(0.0870) (0.108)
Legal 0.205*** 0.218***
(0.0394) (0.0487)
FTA 0.198** 0.207
(0.0812) (0.126)
Obs 27,200 27,200 27,200 27,200 27,200 27,200
R2 0.644 0.644 0.882 0.377 0.377 0.739
All regressions include importer-industry and exporter dummies. Two-way clustered standard errors by
exporter-industry and country-pair are in parenthesis. Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
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Table 4: Services trade - Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Virtual VA Gross exports
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
× ln
(
Lhs
Lus
)
0.0983*** 0.0982*** 0.0982*** 0.0647* 0.0889** 0.0889**
(0.0316) (0.0323) (0.0347) (0.0359) (0.0377) (0.0407)
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
0.161** 0.175** 0.175** 0.0680 0.130 0.130
(0.0706) (0.0736) (0.0796) (0.0848) (0.0906) (0.0976)
ln
(
k
lus
)
× ln
(
K
Lus
)
0.00591 0.00591 -0.0191 -0.0191
(0.00924) (0.00999) (0.0125) (0.0134)
ln
(
k
lus
)
-0.0582 -0.0582 0.0165 0.0165
(0.0471) (0.0504) (0.0543) (0.0588)
Log(distance) -0.648*** -0.371***
(0.0398) (0.0620)
Same cty 4.290*** 6.675***
(0.169) (0.264)
Share border 0.307*** 0.530***
(0.0818) (0.106)
Common lang 0.0608 0.112
(0.0870) (0.126)
Colony 0.162* 0.300***
(0.0872) (0.105)
Legal 0.194*** 0.207***
(0.0401) (0.0481)
FTA -0.0863* -0.0957
(0.0523) (0.0747)
Obs 408,000 408,000 408,000 408,000 408,000 408,000
R2 0.645 0.645 0.870 0.374 0.375 0.707
All regressions include importer-industry-year and exporter-year dummies. Two-way clustered standard
errors by exporter-industry and country-pair are in parenthesis. Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
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Table 5: Total trade - Cross-section
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Virtual VA Gross exports
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
× ln
(
Lhs
Lus
)
0.207*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.205*** 0.217*** 0.217***
(0.0301) (0.0321) (0.0335) (0.0392) (0.0417) (0.0433)
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
0.370*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.448*** 0.446*** 0.446***
(0.0768) (0.0798) (0.0833) (0.0970) (0.102) (0.106)
ln
(
k
lus
)
× ln
(
K
Lus
)
0.00321 0.00321 -0.0185 -0.0185
(0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0154) (0.0159)
ln
(
k
lus
)
0.0510 0.0510 0.108 0.108
(0.0544) (0.0563) (0.0668) (0.0692)
Log(distance) -0.638*** -0.620***
(0.0466) (0.0645)
Same cty 3.222*** 4.530***
(0.177) (0.215)
Share border 0.416*** 0.612***
(0.0877) (0.102)
Common lang 0.0434 0.0789
(0.0861) (0.0949)
Colony 0.185** 0.328***
(0.0874) (0.0941)
Legal 0.196*** 0.237***
(0.0401) (0.0432)
FTA 0.292*** 0.352***
(0.0835) (0.112)
Obs 52,720 52,720 52,720 52,720 52,720 52,720
R2 0.653 0.653 0.859 0.503 0.504 0.757
All regressions include importer-industry and exporter dummies. Two-way clustered standard errors by
exporter-industry and country-pair are in parenthesis. Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
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Table 6: Total trade - Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Virtual VA Gross exports
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
× ln
(
Lhs
Lus
)
0.189*** 0.180*** 0.180*** 0.182*** 0.193*** 0.193***
(0.0275) (0.0293) (0.0306) (0.0356) (0.0374) (0.0389)
ln
(
lhs
lus
)
0.329*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.388*** 0.384*** 0.384***
(0.0684) (0.0706) (0.0735) (0.0854) (0.0893) (0.0926)
ln
(
k
lus
)
× ln
(
K
Lus
)
0.00401 0.00401 -0.0164 -0.0164
(0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0142) (0.0147)
ln
(
k
lus
)
0.0444 0.0444 0.0992 0.0992
(0.0478) (0.0496) (0.0603) (0.0625)
Log(distance) -0.730*** -0.722***
(0.0398) (0.0538)
Same cty 3.155*** 4.451***
(0.184) (0.230)
Share border 0.371*** 0.561***
(0.0834) (0.0962)
Common lang 0.0489 0.0853
(0.0895) (0.0988)
Colony 0.138 0.277***
(0.0879) (0.0931)
Legal 0.184*** 0.222***
(0.0410) (0.0436)
FTA 0.00189 0.0374
(0.0546) (0.0676)
Obs 790,440 790,440 790,440 790,440 790,440 790,440
R2 0.652 0.652 0.847 0.495 0.495 0.731
All regressions include importer-industry-year and exporter-year dummies. Two-way clustered standard
errors by exporter-industry and country-pair are in parenthesis. Significant at: *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
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FIGURE 1
Virtual value-added exports vs. exports
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FIGURE 2
Virtual trade in value added
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FIGURE 3
China exports and virtual VA exports
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FIGURE 4
China virtual value-added exports vs. exports
Agri
Mining
Textile
Leather
Chemical
Plastic
Metal
Machinery
Elect equip
Tran equip
Oth manuf
Wholesale
Finance
Biz serv
Agri
Mining
Textile
Leather
Chemical
Plastic
Metal
Machinery
Elect equip
Tran equip
Oth manuf
Wholesale
Finance
Biz serv
Exports VA exports 
CHN
24
FIGURE 5
Japan exports and virtual VA exports
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FIGURE 6
Japan virtual value-added exports vs. exports
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FIGURE 7
Manufacturing
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FIGURE 8
Services
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FIGURE 9
Heckscher-Ohlin effects: VA vs. gross flows (2009)
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Note: This figure is inspired by Figure 1 in Romalis (2004).
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FIGURE 10
Factor content predictions: Tests a` la Trefler and Zhu (2010)
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